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1. INTRODUCTION 
When new space vehicles are developed, typical technical approaches concentrate on 
defining the functionality needed in those vehicles and the capabilities which must 
implement the functions. Specifications often describe the avionics processes, inputs and 
outputs. However, it is often late in the program development before the behavior of the 
functions and their system/subsystems is addressed; e.g., the definition of which outputs 
respond to which inputs, when and under what conditions. Yet the behavior of avionics 
systems is key to the successful operation of space vehicles, and more thorough under- 
standing of space avionics behavior is needed. 
A view of the shuttle and station avionics, as suggested in Figure 1-1, typically shows the 
different hardware black boxes and their interfaces, but the behavior of those boxes across 
their interfaces (which is represented by the gray arrow arcs) is often not described well - it 
is difficult to show behavior in a diagram. Behavior (in this context) is described by the 
mission, vehicle and system/subsystem configurations and potential interactions; by 
scenarios which map out how interactions should proceed; and by the rules set up by 
developers on what inputs may be given to and what responses are desired in return of the 
avionics systems. This behavior is captured in part by descriptions of the modes and states 
of the system. 
An analysis of the possible modes and states in space generic avionics has been performed by 
Lockheed Engineering & Sciences Company (LESC) for the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration's (NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC). One purpose of this analysis was to 
develop a more precise definition of the modes and states to which generic avionics can be 
subjected. Another purpose was to provide inputs to a simulation of the behavior of the Space 
Generic Open Avionics Architecture (SGOAA) model for the entities in flight vehicle core 
avionics being developed. (The SGOAA reference model is described in IwRA931). The modes 
and states analysis was based on the modes analysis being performed for the Space Station 
Freedom (SSF) program (see [SUL92]), in particular the integrated avionics modes being 
defined. Examples referencing the SSF are based on SSF design prior to the 1993 restructuring. 
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he objective of this study was to develop a topology for describing the behavior of mission, 
vehicle and system/subsystem entities in new flight vehicle designs based on the use of I 
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open standards. It also had to define and describe the modes and states which may be used 
, in generic avionics behavioral descriptions, describe their interrelationships, and establish a 
method for applying generic avionics to actual flight vehicle designs. 
1.2 ORGANIZATION 
This analysis report consists of the introduction in Section 1, including the definitions in 
section 1.3. Section 2 presents a description of the mission modes, vehicle modes, avionics 
subsystem states, and Space Data System Services (SDSS) subsystem states. Section 3 
presents some conclusions and recommendations about -sing modes and states in 
developing space systems. 
Figure 1-1. Apriori Knowledge of Functional Behavior is Important! 
1.3 DEFINITIONS 
An Avionics Svstem is defined for the purpose of the SGOAA model as the set of all 
electronic and processing based subsystems on a space vehicle, including all hardware, 
software and other electronics needed to control and operate the space vehicle. It is the 
collection of capabilities that provides the coordinated functionality for end-to-end 
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processing in handling the information needed to know the platform's elements, to control 
its interaction with its environment, and to respond to human commands. Avionics 
provide for information acquisition, transmission, and storage of analog or digital signals 
and include the sensors, intra-platform communications, processing hardware, software 
and subsystems, data storage, human-machine interface subsystems, and response actuator 
controls used in the platform. (Adapted from JSC 31000, Vol3, Rev E, Para 3.1.24.1.1) 
An entity is an abstract element that represents a real world unit, its data attributes and 
essential services with their respective performance and quality characteristics. It is used 
similarly to the term object from object oriented analysis, without intending to convey the 
implicit assumptions associated with object by practitioners of object oriented analysis and 
design. It is the classification of items (i.e., things) related to application portability. 
A function is an action/task that the system must perform to satisfy customer and 
developer needs. 
A lodcal interface is defined as the characteristic requirements associated with an 
interaction between a source of data and the end user of the data. 
A mode is a predefined set of hardware and software configurations, and associated 
procedures used to organize and manage the conditions of operation for an avionics 
system's behavior, as planned (in advance) or directed by a human. Modes may have 
several levels of expanding detail. 
A direct interface is defined as the routing requirements associated with passing data from 
the source of the data to the end user of the data. Data is used by an entity in a physical 
manner if it passes the data on without changing the data; thus for example, network 
operating systems are direct interfaces to applications because they package or unpack data 
and send it to another network node. Direct interface requirements are normally a design 
issue unless the physical implementation has implications for the logical use or need for 
data, only then should the physical implementation be specified as a requirement. For 
instance, a service such as a Reports Generator getting data from a Data Base Manager might 
not need to know the inter-network addressing of the Data Base Manager, but the Network 
Manager providing the data would need to know the routing requirements of the hardware 
services. 
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The Space Data System Services is a generic functional architecture designed to provide a 
comprehensive set of data processing services to all space vehicles and subsystems. 
The SPace Generic Open Avionics Architecture is defined as the target open architecture 
umbrella standard being developed to establish the preliminary standard for functional, 
hardware, software and interface models. It is a generic architecture, meaning that the 
elements of the architecture do not depend on any one mission or program for their 
definition. The elements of the architecture can be tailored to apply to many different space 
missions and programs. Tailoring may result in subsets of requirements applicable to a 
mission or program, but will retain architectural interface compatibility. The initial focus of 
the SGOAA architecture is for Space Vehicles; Other-Planet Bases are part of the SGOAA 
architecture, but are not being addressed for now until the architecture has been refined. 
The SGOAA model includes a functional architecture to define the generic functions and 
structure needed for specific avionics capabilities. 
A state is a set of hardware and software configurations which identify the intervening or 
instantaneous organization and constraints on the conditions of operation for an avionics 
subsystem's behavior, resulting from mode commands, as established by the system. 
Several states may result from one mode command. The existence of unexpected 
configurations in states indicates potential operating problems. 
A system is the composite of equipment, material, computer software, personnel, facilities 
and inforrnation/procedural data that satisfies a user need. (Electronic Industries 
Association Bulletin SYSB-1) 
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2. MODES AND STATES 
Modes and states were developed by considering the interfaces for a space vehicle. The skin of 
the spacecraft was defined to be the boundary for partitioning between external and internal 
interfaces. The boundary between modes and states was based on partitioning between 
activities planned and directly controlled by humans Ce., a mode) and those activities directed, 
in response, by the machine (i.e., a state). Some activities were recognized as transcending all 
boundaries, such as operational procedures. However, even such transcending activities can be 
implemented by partitioning them along an established boundary; when one does so, then the 
procedures can be more closely linked with the activities and subsystems defined by that 
boundary. Such linkages can enable transcending activities to be more clearly implemented. 
2.1 GENERAL BEHAVIOR 
Modes are those activities planned in advanced and accordingly implemented along a timeline 
established by humans, or are activities directly under human control. A mode represents a 
unique set of behaviors, with mutually exclusive functions. A mode establishes the set of 
commands and resulting functions and controls which are available to personnel at a point in 
the mission of a vehicle; that is, modes establish control sets for operator activities and 
procedures. They insure all activities commanded by humans are consistent across the 
alternative operating configurations, functions and system behaviors. Modes do not establish 
controls over systems per se, although modes would be implemented in part by systems. A 
mode model can be developed which is the set of modes governing the behavior of a specific 
mission or vehicle. A mode model identifies the set of allowable commands and responses 
(e.g., functions, signals or activities) for each command. The internal/external vehicle interface 
boundary is used in distinguishing between commands affecting the externally-observed 
behaviors which could affect other vehicles or facilities. Modes affecting other external entities 
are defined as mission modes. Modes affecting other internal entities are defined as vehicle 
modes. 
Mode transitions may (and probably wjll) have conditions and checks required to be performed 
before a transition may take place to insure it is safe to perform the transition. Safing is a 
condition of reduced functionality since its purpose is to facilitate transitions. Since mode 
transitions are caused by human command, the combinations and timings of all possible 
commands may not have been fully explored and tested. Prior to a routine transition, a safety 
check should be performed to insure that all desired activities in the mode being exited have 
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been completed, no residual conditions have been created which would create a risk in the 
mode being entered, and that conditions are ready for entry into the commanded mode. 
However, capabilities for special mode transitions (or exits, such as on crew command) would 
be needed. It would be desirable for special mode transitions if specific safety procedures were 
in place to be used to perform special or emergency terminations of on-going activities. Thus 
the specific activities of a "safing" check are context dependent and will be different for each 
mode transition. Safing is particularly needed after a failure when the system is more likely to 
be perturbed; however, it is also relevant in normal conditions for complex missions where 
command confusion may be possible. 
States are the activities that a system or subsystem adopts in response to a mode input. A 
system/subsystem may step through several states in transitioning between one mode and 
another. Systems respond to mode commands by automatically entering a sequence of states, 
controlled by closed loop control algorithms which are specific to the selected mode. A state 
represents a unique set of stable system or subsystem behaviors in a closed loop control 
algorithm. Different states have mutually exclusive functions (e.g., the state "operate" is 
mutually exclusive to the state "standby".) States must allow override and manual controls by 
crew. Manual control over low level entities must not be precluded by logic designed into any 
system, although inhibition logic in the fonn of downloadable (and thus changeable) tables of 
rules may be used to establish a-priori crew guidelines on activities and capabilities which can 
be disabled through software. 
State transitions are typically caused by mode changes. The transition between modes causes a 
change in the states of subsystems, with subsystems moving through a sequence of states until 
stable operation in the new (directed) mode has been achieved. State transitions can be used to 
define and describe special subsystem behaviors such as needed for autonomous operations, 
closed loop controls or as a response to failures. Safing is also needed in state transitions, but 
should be less complicated than mode safing since all states should have been pre-defined. 
Selected combinations of states will have been tested; however, in complex systems not all 
combinations can be tested due to cost considerations. Capabilities for special state transitions 
(e.g., exits, such as in response to crew commands) may be needed if specific safety procedures 
were to be used to perform special or emergency terminations of on-going activities. Thus, a 
safety check should be performed to insure that all activities in the state being exited have been 
completed, no residual conditions have been created which would create a risk in the state 
being entered, and that conditions are ready for entry into the directed state. 
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The key difference between a mode and a state is that a mode is planned in advance or 
directed by a human, while a state is the response configuration adopted by a processing 
controlled system/subsystem. A state may be a complex configuration with many subsets, 
or it may be a simple configuration at the lowest level consisting of a switch setting such as 
on-off. 
Where a system is complex, and consists of several subsystems, each of which also consists of 
lower level subsystems, states may be very complex. If (as is normal in many programs) the 
subsystems have been parceled out to different subcontractors for development, then each 
subsystem so developed may have its own set of states which may be independently developed 
from any other subsystem states. Then the total aggregation of states for several subsystems 
may not be well understood, and may not have been rigorously tested under all possible input 
sets. While states have to be predefined and known for each low level subsystem when they 
are developed, as these are aggregated into larger subsystems, the combinations of predefined 
state sets may become very large, with unknown or unexpected sets of combinations becoming 
possible. Three possibilities can exist: (1) unknown non-operational states which are errors, (2) 
operational states which are unexpected, and (3) operational states which are expected. The last 
is obviously the preferred condition. However, planning and design must also consider 
handling of the first two cases. The modes and states approach in this document can facilitate 
such planning and design. 
When hazardous activities are being commanded in a mode, or being implemented in a state, 
the operation should take place completely within the one mode, and be divisible into a 
sequence of states each of which contains any hazardous activity completely within the one 
state. The objective is to not have any hazardous activities underway when a mode or state 
transition occurs since transitions are, by definition, inherently unstable. Transitions with 
hazardous activities underway potentially increase any risk from the hazard. 
Four types of mode and state models, as illustrated in Figure 2-1, have been defined 
0 Mission mode model governing mission element behavior 
Vehicle mode model governing internal vehicle behavior 
0 Subsystem state model identifying potential subsystem element behavior, with the 
Avionics Subsystem used as an example 
0 Function state model identifying potential functional element behavior, with Space 
Data System Services used as an example. 
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On the left in Figure 2-1 is the hierarchy of elements required in a mission, from the 
mission entities, to the vehicle internal entities, to the subsystem entities, to the functional 
entities. Within each level, there are multiple entities controlled by one entity called a 
controller (CTRL). The behavior of the CTRL entity can be described by a model of either 
modes or states, as represented by the rounded rectangles in the center of the figure. Mode 
and state behavior at each level of the hierarchy is linked by the commands issued, controls 
generated, events occurring, and resulting adions which can all be detected throughout the 
hierarchy by various checks and tests. Such detections can in turn cause additional actions 
to take place. 
Mission modes are behaviors across those external interfaces to a flight vehicle which 
enable the flight vehicle to perform a mission in concert with other supporting vehicles or 
facilities, such as the tracking and data relay satellite system (TDRSS) or the mission control 
center (MCC). 
Vehicle modes are behaviors across those internal interfaces to a flight vehicle which 
enable humans and/or the flight vehicle software to organize the vehicle's capabilities to 
perform directed missions. 
Subsvstem states, such as in the avionics subsystem, are behaviors internal to a flight 
vehicle (or internal to a supporting facility) which identlfl the potential response 
configurations a subsystem, such as avionics, may adopt or make in changing between 
modes. 
Function states are behaviors internal to a flight vehicle which identify the potential 
response configurations a major function (or lower level subsystem such as the data 
services function or subsystem, guidance navigation and control function or subsystem or 
other applications function or subsystem) may adopt in or make in changing between 
modes or subsystem states. Figure 2-1 depicts the relationships of modes and states in a 
flight vehicle. 
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Figure 2-1. Levels of Modes and States in a Flight vehicle 
Each mission mode may cause multiple vehicle modes to occur or be blocked. Each vehicle 
mode may in turn cause multiple subsvstem states to occur or be blocked. Similarly, each 
subsvstem state may cause multiple function states to occur or be blocked. Activities at each 
level are linked to activities at other levels through the creation of commands, controls and 
events, which are detected by other entities at the same or other levels. These detections act 
as inputs to the detecting entity, causing it to act if necessary according to the rules 
governing that entity's behavior. The resulting sets of lower level configurations may be 
different for each higher level mode or state; they may use similar names for similar 
behaviors (e.g., scheduled vs. interruptive testing), or they may use similar names for 
totally different behaviors (e+, standby mode vs. storage state). 
The specific modes identified below in the mission and vehicle mode sets are not intended 
to be the only possible modes. Additional modes may be needed in specific 
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2.2 MISSION MODES 
Mission modes describe the control of the interactions of entities at the highest level of a 
mission, such as the space vehicle with other facilities or platforms as shown in Figure 2-2. 
The mission entities (shown in the upper left of the figure) are the major standalone 
elements or systems involved in a mission, and are under the operational control of a 
mission control entity. The behavior of the mission controller (MSN-CTRL) entity is 
shown in the lower right of the figure in the mission mode model. 
Mission Entities: 
(See Figure 2-3 for detail) 
Figure 2-2. Mission Mode Transitions Implement the Mission Controls 
Although not all mission entities are shown in the figure; the vehicles are the entities 
carrying crew, payloads and/or supplies for the mission; and the ground control systems are 
the support systems on the ground, the launch systems, the test and checkout systems, etc. 
needed to get the mission off the ground and into orbit. The TDRSS is usually thought of as 
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a "pipe", but is in fact an end system in its own right, since it may have to be configured 
specially to support a mission. For instance, on the Common Lunar Lander Artemis 
program (at one point in its development), constraints on TDRSS coverage were limiting 
Artemis' ability to send telemetry back to the ground control systems, and would have 
required special TDRSS configuration control changes to insure sufficient telemetry 
coverage (until the requirements were changed). The mission control entity is the overall 
control entity for the mission; although this is usually associated with the MCC, in this 
instance, the control is the generic function which may or may not necessarily be centered 
in the MCC. 
The key is that the MSN-CTRL is a processing entity which governs the interactions of its 
"sibling" mission level entities. This controller determines what sets of mission 
commands and responses are allowed under what conditions, and at what times or in what 
sequences. This behavioral control is based on rules and procedures planned and 
established by humans, and only human-directed behaviors are allowed under the 
conditions set up by the human plans. Such directed behaviors may be immediate, or may 
have been preplanned and implemented by a timelined sequence. As a result of these 
modes; command, controls, and events may be established which in turn constrain or 
initiate activities and procedures in lower level entities. 
Thus, the mission modes define the sets of allowable mission element behavior which the 
MSN-CTRL can effect. Each mode encompasses the set of commands, controls, events, 
conditions and procedures needed to safely operate the mission in a stable manner. The 
transition cheeks from one mission mode to another establish how the MSN-CTRL entity 
can establish transitions from one stable set of operations and ground rules to another set of 
operations with different ground des. For instance, changing from ORBIT COAST to 
REBOOST involves a number of specialized functions which insure that reboosting does 
not occur in an unsafe manner due to unsafe combinations of subsystem configurations 
and crew activities. For the generic case of any type of space vehicle, twelve modes are 
identified. These modes and their allowable transition paths are shown in more detail in 
Figure 2-3. Note the identification of examples of specific functions to be provided in 
selected modes. 
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Figure 2-3. Generic Mission Mode Transitions are Constrained 
The default entry for normal missions is shown by the black ball and arrow in the lower 
left. The first set of modes involves getting the mission launched. PRE-LAUNCH activities 
prepare the vehicle using the appropriate ground launch systems, checkout consoles, test 
equipment, pre-launch procedures, etc. When the space vehicle is approved for launch, the 
MSN-CTRL entity enables the set of activities allowed under LAUNCH, while disabling the 
set of activities under PRE-LAUNCH. Only then can special events such as fuel and 
oxidizer loading take place with the appropriate safety controls and systems in place. From 
LAUNCH, two paths are allowed: one to BOOST to orbit, and a second for a direct return to 
landing. 
BOOST performs the needed ascent activity control, such as atmospheric maneuvering, 
booster/staging separation, etc.; places the space vehicle in orbit; separates the launch 
vehicle from the mission spacecraft; performs the needed maneuvering to achieve interim 
and final orbits; recommends and/or performs collision avoidance maneuvering; insures 
securing object messages are transmitted to on- 
conditions enabled by the crew or ground systems to insure mission, vehicle and safety 
crew, etc. BOOST is constrained by 
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critical activities occur as desired by the cre 
interlocks, as dis later. 
The paths from LAUNCH to LANDTNG a 
option for abort from launch and post-la 
Depending on the specific capabilities of the missi 
could be through use of an emergency escape capsule, by ejection of the manned 
from the launch vehicle and return t 
Note also that a path from BOOST t 
mechanisms for a change from one set of activities while boosting in orbit to a rehun to 
earth, if a return (for instance due to significant problems) were necessary. Safe condition 
checks in transitioning from BOOST to LANDING might include verification that solid 
rocket boosters have been jettisoned, and are not a hazard to the command vehicle. 
or by other mechanis 
is provided to allow 
Finally, ORBIT COAST is achieved as the NISN_CTRL completes the last boost operation 
and carries out the controls necessary to change from the BOOST mode to the ORBIT 
COAST mode, which is assumed to be a primary mode and reason for many of the space 
missions. During ORBIT COAST, the appropriate payload activities can be enabled, 
experiments can take place such as in the microgravity controlled environment, power 
conservation activities may be carried out, safe and survival activities are enabled as 
needed. Controls over all activities internal to the flight vehicle are included in the ORBXT 
COAST mode. Controls over any activities external to the mission spacecraft, such as 
extravehicular activity (EVA), are treated as different mission modes, requiring special sets 
of rules to be carried out and subsystems to be used. Due to the potential for problems or 
interference between external and internal flight vehicle activities, and the potential risk to 
crew members while outside the flight vehicle, external activities have been included 
under their own modes, rather than included in ORBIT COAST, as described below. 
Communications required with external entities is another important reason. 
From ORBIT COAST, other modes may be entered, such as SPACE MOBILE OPERATIONS, 
VEHICLE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS, SHUT-DOWN, BOOST, and DEORBIT. Each 
transition would have a set of nrles to be carried out before the old mode could be disabled 
de could be enabled. Some transitions would be caused or inhilited by 
controls or events detected by condition sensing processes. SPACE 
the control structures needed in a flight 
vehicle which must constrain its orbit (or other) operations due to needs associated with 
RATIONS is provided to 
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other flight vehicle. For instance, if an orbiting laboratory must constrain its ability to 
move to a new orbit because an untethered vehicle or satellite will be returning later that 
day, then SPACE MOBILE OPERATIONS would provide the mixture of joint controls, such 
as energy or orbit management modes, that affect both the laboratory and the satellite's need 
for effective operations to enable them to later perfom a rendezvous. VEHICLE SPACE 
PROXIMITY OPERATIONS is provided to support local external activities around the flight 
vehicle, such as egress, EVA, mobile servicing, and ingress. For instance, an astronaut on 
EVA in VEHICLE SPACE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS mode, would constrain or interlock 
the flight vehicle from going into BOOST or DEORBIT mode unless overridden. System 
safety checks would venfy such interlocks had been released before systems activation was 
allowed. 
DEORBIT is the beginning of those activities leading the flight vehicle back to the surface. 
The controls to do this are partitioned into several sets: DEORBIT, LANDING, and POST- 
LANDING. DEORBIT provides those controls needed to insure a safe departure from orbit 
into the reentry window. LANDING provides those controls needed to insure a safe 
setdown on the surface. Allocations of specific controls such as for guidance to the landing 
site could be to either mode; a reasonable rule for such partitioning is that all control 
activities associated with leaving orbit and entering atmosphere are part of DEORBE, while 
all control activities associated with maneuvering in atmosphere to the touchdown site, 
touching down, and operations to immediately shutdown or secure appropriate subsystems 
on the flight vehicle (e.g., engine shutdown and oxidizer and fuel safing) would be part of 
LANDING. POST-LANDING is envisioned to encompass those control activities which 
provide for spacecraft security (e.g., airlock-engine interlock release) after touch down, the 
activities inside the flight vehicle after touch down (for rest and experimentation) and those 
activities that are needed after touch down to prepare the vehicle for its next set of mission 
activities. From the flight vehicle operations viewpoint, since POST-LANDING is 
concerned with securing the vehicle, this is interpreted to include those vehicle security 
aspects related to protecting and safely operating the vehicle while payload experimentation 
is conducted. After landing, vehicle activities will probably take place that interact with the 
environment external to the flight vehicle, including SHUTDOWN, VEHICLE SURFACE 
PROXIMITY OPERATIONS, or SURFACE MOBILE OPERATIONS. 
The set of control behaviors permissible after the POST-LANDING checks have been 
completed depend on the purpose of the landing. If the vehicle has returned to earth, then 
the probable control structure is SHUT-DOWN. However, if the landing is on another 
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planetary body such as the moon or mars, then the probable control structures are 
continued POST-LANDING experiments, VEHICLE SURFACE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS 
or SURFACE MOBILE OPERATIONS. Since on-surface experiments conducted inside the 
flight vehicle are usually treated as payloads, they are relatively independent of the flight 
vehicle operations per se, and would have their own control structures. Support (if any) for 
them from the flight vehicle subsystems would be provided for under the POST-LANDING 
mode. Similarly, experiments conducted outside the flight vehicle (on another planetary 
body) would have their own control structures, and would be supported by the surface 
operations modes described next. 
VEHICLE SURFACE PROXIMITY OPERATIONS is provided to support local external 
activities around the flight vehicle, such as egress, surface EVA, surface vehicle servicing, 
and ingress. For instance, an astronaut on going to EVA in VEHICLE SURFACE 
PROXIMITY OPERATIONS mode, would be constrained from opening both airlock doors 
unless overridden and engines could not be fired if an astronaut were on EVA. SURFACE 
MOBILE OPERATIONS is provided to establish the control structures needed in a flight 
vehicle which must constrain its local operations or experiments due to needs associated 
with other vehicles. The most likely vehicle requiring flight vehicle constraints would be 
rovers being prepared for operations, performing tasks or being recovered. For instance, if a 
surface lander vehicle must constrain its ability to refuel from an unmanned supply vehicle 
because a manned rover is operating locally, then SURFACE MOBILE OPERATIONS would 
provide the mixture of joint vehicle operations controls, such as collision avoidance, fluids 
management and joint navigation modes, that affect both the flight vehicle, the supply 
vehicle and the rover's need for effective operations to enable safe operations. 
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2.3 VEHICLE MODES 
Vehicle modes describe the control of the major vehicle entities in support of the current 
mission mode, as shown in Figure 2-4. The vehicle entities are the major subsystems, such 
as the power, propulsion, fuels, oxidizer, and avionics subsystems, which are needed to 
properly configure a spacecraft. Each of these major subsystems must be under the 
operational control of some control entity, which is defined in the generic architecture to be 
part of the Space Operations Control Subsystem (SOCS). In the Space Station Freedom 
program, CTRL-VEH-SOCS is performed by the Integrated Station Executive (ISE), with 
perhaps the support of the Timeliner. 
I Vehicle Entities: 
Figure 2-4. Vehicle Mode Transitions Implement the Vehicle Controls 
The vehicle entities that are under CTRL-VEH-SOCS are shown in Figure 2-5 for the 
generic architecture. Each of these entities contains all the hardware, software, procedures 
and rules needed to operate as a subsystem in the flight vehicle. While the figure appears to 
be SOCS or SDSS centric, this is only because the figure is showing the control by the SOCS 
carried out through the SDSS. Note that all subsystems must respond to the crew, through 
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the Crew Display and Control (D&C) subsystem, which is the crew's entry point into to the 
automated and processing subsystem of the flight vehicle. 
The Payload and Science Operations Subsystem (BO) is under the flight vehicle SOCS 
control because it must be subservient to the needs of the flight vehicle and safe vehicle 
operation. However, it is assumed that it operates relatively independently, with its own 
controllers, and control modes which are not covered in this document. Similarly, the 
Launch Support (rS) Interface Subsystem provides the interface controls from the flight 
vehicle to the launch center subsystems, especially prior to vehicle liftoff. The Digital Flight 
Instrumentation (DE) Subsystem includes the instruments needed in experimental flight 
vehicle flights. 
While environmental control will be needed in essentially all vehicles, the life support in 
the Environment and Life Support (ELS) Subsystem would obviously only be needed in 
spacecraft operated by humans. The environmental controls in the ELS may be active (such 
as an electronics heat dissipation capability) or passive (such as insulating blankets). ELS is 
provided for generality since the SGOAA can be applied to both crewed and uncrewed 
vehicles. The Electric Power Subsystem (EPS) provides the power either from batteries, 
solar arrays, nuclear power generators, a combination of these or other means. The 
Communications and Tracking (C&T) subsystem provides the multiple link 
communications, the interfaces to external systems such as TDRSS and tracking radars and 
processing as needed. The Guidance Navigation and Control (GN&C) subsystem provides 
these capabilities, while Propulsion is under GN&C subsystem control due to its sensitivity 
and time latency requirements. 
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N d  All Interfaces Shown 
Figure 2-5. Space Vehicle Entities Must be Controlled in All Modes 
Figure 2-6 represents a view of the major vehicle subsystems in a spacecraft (represented in 
white), and the associated avionics elements (represented in grey), partitioned by a plane 
drawn horizontally through their centers representing that each vehicle subsystem has 
embedded avionics. The vehicle subsystems and their associated commands and controls 
can be partitioned into modes and states by a plane through their centers corresponding to 
the partitioning between subsystems and avionics elements. Thus, for each white box, there 
nds result in the 
01 element in the 
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by the subsystems, especially the avionics elements, and results in a series of state controls 
being issued by the avionics elements. These state controls will usually result in the 
avionics achieving a series of intermediate states until the originating human mode 
command has been fully implemented, countermanded or aborted. Vehicle subsystems in 
each flight vehicle entity include all the other non-avionics elements needed by a vehicle 
entity, such as vehicle physics, crew procedures, etc. which enable the vehicle to act and 
interact in response to crew as well as other external environment entities. 
Avionics state controls in each of the flight vehicle entities result in operation which is 
transparent and responsive to the crew. The avionics for state control includes all the 
hardware, software and processing procedures needed to operate the flight vehicle. Selected 
interfaces between avionics entities (grey) are represented by the lines in Figure 2-6. 
Although interface activity is directed by humans between entities, control over use of such 
linkages is a state control issue. 
The key to vehicle control is the SOCS, which provides the overall vehicle control function. 
It governs the interactions of its "sibling" vehicle entities as shown in Figures 2-4 and 2-6. It 
determines the allocation of resources to other vehicle entities, controls the timing or 
sequencing of their activities, and generally determines what sets of vehicle commands and 
responses are allowed under what conditions. As in the mission modes, this behavioral 
control is based on rules and procedures established by humans, and only human-directed 
behaviors are allowed under the conditions set up by the human plans. As a result of these 
modes, command, controls, and events may be established which in turn constrain or 
initiate activities and procedures in lower level entities. 
The vehicle modes define the sets of allowable functional behavior which the 
CTRL-VEH-SOCS can effect. Each mode encompasses the set of commands, controls, 
events, conditions and procedures needed to safely operate the vehicle in a stable manner. 
The transitions from one vehicle mode to another establish how the CTRL-VEH-SOCS 
entity transitions from one stable set of operations and ground rules to another set of 
operations with different ground rules. For instance, changing from INTEGRATED 
SYSTEM (END-TO-END) TEST to NORMAL OPERATION involves a number of 
specialized functions not normally needed, and specialized data which must be properly 
controlled and purged from the system so test data is not erroneously interpreted as 
operational data. 
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For the generic space vehicle, ten modes are identified, directly based on the SSF modes 
analysis (as reported in [SUL92]. These modes and their allowable transiti 
shown in Figure 2-7. Any mode may be further decompos 
showing the details of lower level control structures. Not 
normal operations, if everything is working toward a sta 
or special activities planned. All the other paths become executable under varying sets of 
special circumstances, such as VEHICLE ASSEMBLY for new vehicle construction or 
VEHICLE TRAINING for directed training missions. 
The default entry for normal vehicle operations is into a vehicle with no power applied, 
which must be powered-up (and booted). For instance, many spacecraft are powered up on 
the pad prior to launch, even though many hours or even days may pass before the 
spacecraft needs to operate independently from its launch vehicle, because issues such as 
the timing may need special synchronization, the position fix may need special 
determinations, or special test and checkout on activation may be needed by the mission 
flight vehicle that is not met by the launch vehicle. When VEHICLE OFF mode is entered, 
power must be applied to enable the flight vehicle to become active, to be assembled, or 
initialized. Some external input is usually needed to enable the VEHICLE OFF mode to be 
exited. 
From VEHICLE OFF, only two paths are allowed: one to VEHICLE ASSEMBLY and another 
to VEHICLE INITIALIZATION. VEHICLE ASSEMBLY enables pieces of the flight vehicle to 
be put together. These pieces may be hardware requiring assembly before the VEHICLE 
INITIALIZATION (or startup) may take place. Alternatively, the flight vehicle may have 
subsystems or subassemblies which need to be separately initialized and checked out prior 
to VEHICLE INITIALIZATION, or it may have subsystems or subassemblies already 
operating in a safe condition which need to be put together and checked out for some partial 
capability before VEHICLE INITIALIZATION can take place. From VEHICLE ASSEMBLY, 
two modes may be entered: VEHICLE INITIALIZATION, or INTEGRATED SYSTEM (END- 
TO-END) TEST. 
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Figure 2-7. Vehicle Mode Transitions Must be Constrained 
VEHICLE INITIALIZATION is the startup effort to activate operational capability in the 
flight vehicle, which may be full operational capability (FOCI or may be some lesser level of 
initial operating capability (100. This mode ensures that the flight vehicle subsystems are 
started up in the proper sequence, with appropriate safety controls, so they can integrate 
their operating activities correctly. Part of VEHICLE INITIALIZATION is the giving the 
command for a power-on self test (POST), needed to insure the vehicle is operating properly 
before exiting from this mode. Commanding of the POST is not the same thing as entry 
into the INTEGRATED SYSTEM (END-TO-END) TEST; POST is a restricted startup activity 
to test specific components, while INTEGRATED SYSTEM (END-TO-END) TEST is a full 
scale system test sequence. If the POST is failed, then entry into VEHICLE 
SAFE/DEGRADED OPN, INTEGRATED SYSTEM (END-TO-END) TEST, or VEHICLE 
SHUT-DOWN may be mandatory. 
From VEHICLE INITIALEATION, several modes may be entered: STORAGE/STANDBY, 
VEHICLE SAFE/DEGRADED OPN, INTEGRATED SYSTEM (END-TO-END) TEST, or 
VEHICLE SHUT-DOWN. The normal transition out of initialization is into INTEGRATED 
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TEM (END-TO-END) TEST provides 
time when problems 
expected results occur. Interruptive test programs will probably be running to checkout all 
paths and operating conditions of all subsystems. This is more general than POST because 
INTEGRATED SYSTEM (END-TO-END) TEST interferes with normal vehicle operation, 
while POST is performed before a vehicle has started operating and will normally not 
address end-to-end system test issues. This is also different from the testing that would be 
conducted in NORMAL OPERATION, which would not require the attention of the entire 
vehicle and crew. 
STORAGE/STANDBY is a mode of operation used when an initialized and tested flight 
vehicle is to be placed into an almost non-operating condition for some time period, from 
which it will later be recovered and reused. STORAGE is used when there is no crew in 
place and the system must operate in a minimally powered configuration, probably just 
performing periodic built-in-test and awaiting commands to re-activate systems. 
STANDBY is used when there is crew in control; the presence of humans creates a different 
type of operation with a higher level of environmental and systems support. An example 
of vehicle STANDBY was demonstrated by the Lunar Excursion Modules while stowed 
with the command vehicle in the Apollo missions, prior to arrival at lunar orbit. This 
mode can only be entered from VEHICLE INITIALIZATION or INTEGRATED SYSTEM 
(END-TO-END) TEST. If the flight vehicle is being initialized but not intended for current 
and AT10 uld is not 
required to) go into INTEGRATED SYSTEM (ENDTO-END) TEST before storage 
D SYSTEM (END-TO- 
properly before 
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The usual entry into NORMAL OPERATION is from INTEGRATED SYSTEM (END-TO- 
END) TEST. A new vehicle, one which has been powered down, or one which has been 
operating in a degraded mode due to failures or has been undergoing maintenance cannot 
be placed into normal use without testing the entire vehicle to be sure it can safely perform 
its mission. After the vehicle has been performing training activities, a re-entry back into 
NORMAL OPERATION can also be done. NORMAL OPERATION is the ordinary method 
of vehicle operation with all subsystems capable of activity in accordance with their normal 
control rules. 
VEHICLE TRAINING is a special mode in which the vehicle is assigned to a training 
mission, such as required to prepare for more complex later missions, to verify systems and 
crew capabilities, or to train new crew members. VEHICLE TRAINING requires the entire 
vehicle to be performing training activities, probably using special training data in the 
systems; such data would need to be purged before exit from the VEHICLE TRAINING 
mode to avoid confusing systems between operational and simulated data. While in this 
training mode, much activity would probably be simulated in the systems and subsystems, 
depending on the type of training and its purpose. 
VEHICLE SAFE/DEGRADED OPERATION is a mode of control used to indicate that 
significant failures have occurred, during which the mission operation must continue to 
proceed, and a lesser capability than normal can be tolerated. As a vehicle level mode, this 
represents a serious degradation to the vehicle's overall capability, and is not isolated in 
affect to just a small area. The entire vehicle is being re-oriented for survival of the crew 
(first), with the mission (maybe second) depending on specific conditions of the emergency. 
Examples of this were plans during the Apollo missions to recover the astronauts by 
slingshoting around the moon if landing or lunar orbit had to be bypassed due to serious 
problems; or the mission change in the Apollo 13 mission after the command module 
explosion disaster. This mode can be entered from NORMAL OPERATION, 
STORAGE/STANDBY and VEHICLE INITIALIZATION. Failures detected during any of 
these other modes might require special safing routines to be followed to a-aeve safe 
vehicle operation, especially if crew is aboard. 
PERIODIC MAINTENANCE is entered from INTEGRATED SYSTEM (END-TO-END) TEST 
during which it is determined that either failures of sufficient magnitude exist that the 
entire flight vehicle must enter the "shop" for repairs, or a sufficiently long time has passed 
since the last periodic checkout and test of the vehicle that maintenance personnel should 
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check,it out as a routine precaution. This mode is used in lieu of VEHICLE 
SAFE/DEGRADED OPERATION because the vehicle is assumed to be docked with a repair 
depot-like facility where the crew can safely stay while maintenance personnel checkout, 
test and repair any failed capabilities. Before turning the flight vehicle back to the crew, a 
complete INTEGRATED SYSTEM (END-TO-END) TEST would again be run to verify it was 
safe for the crew to resume control. Otherwise, the vehicle would be shut down and then 
powered off and further crew operation could not OCCUT. In some missions or vehicles, the 
INTEGRATED SYSTEM (END-TO-END) TEST and PERIODIC MAINTENANCE modes 
might be the same thing. Note that performance of checkout activities periodically by the 
crew would involve use of the INTEGRATED SYSTEM (END-TO-END) TEST mode, not 
the PERIODIC MAINTENANCE mode. The latter is intended for specialized use with 
specialized software and hardware intruding into the system when the vehicle in not 
involved in a mission, and hence there is no crew operating the vehicle. For example, 
when an aircraft has returned to the hanger or a spacecraft to the vehicle assembly building, 
then maintenance personnel could load special maintenance versions of the operational 
software and use the PERIODIC MAINTENANCE mode to debug problems reported by the 
crew during the operational mission. This mode would not normally be available to the 
operational crew because the corresponding system software would be using special 
maintenance structures with hooks for maintenance debugging which could interfere with 
performance of an operational mission. However, while not recommended, any software 
(such as special maintenance software) can be loaded and executed by the crew if they so 
desire. 
VEHICLE SHUTDOWN may be entered from many of the other modes as shown when the 
vehicle mission is completed or when it is determined that the appropriate use of the 
vehicle can no longer be supported and operation must be terminated, temporarily or 
permanently. During this mode, each of the vehicle entities is prepared for safe shut down; 
with backing up of any needed data bases, completion of diagnostic storage, notifications to 
associated vehicles in the mission or home port facilities, and implementation of proper 
shut down sequences for subsystems. This mode may not be entered from VEHICLE 
ASSEMBLY since the vehicle must be started before it is shutdown; assembly is not a start 
up activity, but is only a route to the startup. Finally, the vehicle must be turned to 
VEHICLE OFF, with no power applied to any subsystem or subassemblies. 
The nominal routing for a normal vehicle start up is shown by the grey arrows in Figure 
2-7. From a power-down condition, the vehicle must initialize all its subsystems in the 
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proper sequence. Then after initialization power-on self tests and initialization is 
completed (successfully), an integrated system test from end-to-end should be run to verify 
correct operation. Only, then can the normal vehicle operations begin, in a normal vehicle 
start up (with no problems encountered). 
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2.4 SUBSYSTEM STATES 
ajor entities within a 
the avionics. The avionics sub 
entities in support of the 
avionics subsystem entiti 
and SDSS, which are nee 
human command and control in the mission and vehicle modes. 
implementation might be accomplished by designing one centralized avionics-controller 
(AV-CTRL) module for all avionics, or by distributing individual CTRL modules to each 
subsystem. In the SSF program, AV-CTRL is done partially by ISE, MCC and the crew 
ma nually. 
the control of the major avionics 
odes, as shown in Fi 
ems, such as GN& 
Each of these major avionics subsystems must be under the control of some control entity 
which is designated as GNC-CTRL, C&T-CTRL, SOCS-CTRL, SDSS-CTRL, etc. Since this 
analysis is intended to be implementation independent, an AV-CTRL entity has been 
defined as the sum of each of these separate -CTRL entities. Another way of looking at the 
AV-CTRL entity is to view all the avionics from on high, with the -CTRL functions 
overlapped; that overlapped set of distinct subfunctions comprises AV-CTRL, and 
AV-CTRL can then be tailored to each avionics subsystem's control needs. 
The key is that the AV-CTRL is a processing entity which governs the interactions of its 
"sibling" avionics level entities. This controller determines what sets of mission, vehicle 
and avionics commands and other inputs meet the predefined criteria for acceptance by the 
avionics, under what predefined conditions, what allowable (predefined) responses can be 
chosen, and at what times or in what sequences. This behavi based on rules 
and procedures established by humans, and implemented by 
These are states rather than modes because they are intervenin 
in carrying out human commands. Only states which start from 
directed behaviors are allowed under the conditions set up by the human plans. As a result 
of these states; command, controls, and events may be established which in turn constrain 
or initiate activities and procedures in lower level entities. 
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For each mode change, there may be several intervening states until the final mode is 
achieved. The state and state transitions define the sets of allowable 
which the AV-CTRL can effect. Each state encompasses the set of commands, controls, 
events, conditions and procedures needed to safely operate the avionics subsystem in a 
stable manner. The transitions from one state to another establish how the AV-CTRL 
entity transitions from one stable set of processes and condition look-up tables to another. 
For instance, entering MANUAL state is necessary to insure the appropriate automated 
controls are set up to enable a human to take manual control, otherwise, the possibility 
exists that as humans try to set switches for one operation, an automated routine elsewhere 
might be trying to counteract their efforts in accordance with its own (presumably obsolete) 
rules and procedures. 
In a complex system with many independently designed subsystems, modules or 
components; each such independently designed unit will probably include its own states 
and state transitions, as its design team interprets the specifications. Since each avionics 
subsystem state consists of the sum of these states of individual subsystems and modules, 
the precise set of intervening states may not result as expected. Only exhaustive (and 
expensive) testing can identify all possible states and their interacting software paths; 
usually such testing can only be afforded for high priority paths. 
Although each state is mutually exclusive, one avionics subsystem could be in one state 
while another is in a different state. So, GN&C might be in a STANDBY state while SOCS is 
in a TRAINING state - this insures a training SOCS command to fire thrusters causes a 
simulated firing rather than a real firing. For the generic architecture, ten states are 
identified. These modes and their allowable transition paths are shown in more detail in 
Figure 2-9. 
The default entry for normal vehicle operation of the avionics is for all power to be off 
(upon vehicle startup); power must then be applied to the normal avionics modules from 
some external source in order to boot the system, as discussed in the next paragraph. The 
application of power in VEHICLE 0 
Avionics can thus be powered up as subassemblies during assembly or as complete 
subsystems during initialization. As can be seen from this point, each avionics subsystem 
state can support different mission and vehicle modes. However, the vehicle or mission 
mode change would carry specific sets of commands, controls, or events which would 
de enables the vehicle to reach either the 
LY or VEHICLE INITIALIZATION mode (as shown in Figure 2-4). 
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indicate to the AV-CTRL which avionics subsystems were to be affected. So the impact on 
avionics of mode changes is due to the command, controls and events which would be 
detected, not directly by the human mode command per se. 
AVIONICS OFF is a "holding" state during which no activity can occur until power gets 
applied; it exists because when systems are in orbit without any power, special planning is 
needed to enable power to be applied, especially under conditions of operation when a "cold 
boot" may be needed. From AVIONICS OFF, the application of external power or use of a 
self-contained battery operated boot module (perhaps in the EPS) can cause entry of the 
(RE)INITIALIZE & (RE)CONFIGURTi state. This means that any time a module is started 
(by the application of power), it must first be initialized and configured before it can be used. 
Such initialization and configuration can be as simple as loading its startup data; or as 
complex as selecting an 
moving the software code into the appropriate processor memory, booting the code, linking 
the code with the appropriate data memory locations, and handing over control of activity 
to that software. 
1 program load, determining the applicable load conditions, 
As indicated in the note in Figure 2-9, an emergency does not enable a different set of states, 
nor does it establish new functions (in general, although special emergency functions may 
be enabled). An emergency primarily enables a different set of priorities, routings and 
procedural rules which allow the system to function much faster to insure the 
uninterrupted handling of the data and/or traffic dealing with the emergency. It is not 
desirable to have a separate emergency state (or mode) because that would imply an 
emergency has a completely different set of functions and procedures not normally used 
which are only used for the emergency. Use of such emergency-only-functions would 
create an undue risk, since these functions might not be as safe or well designed and tested 
as the normal functions. Such emergency-only functions would also increase the size of the 
system without providing any sigmficant increase in emergency condition safety. Since the 
functionality needed in an emergency is the same as (in general) or a subset of the 
functionality needed normally, what needs to change in an emergency is the speed of 
operation and the rules to be followed, not the functions. For instance, in an emergency, 
Remote Object Data Base (RODB) Writes and GN&C Navigation Vector Updates still are 
needed, but much faster (depending on the emergency). 
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The (RE)INITIALIZE & (RE)CONFIGURE state is thus the first state in which activity can 
take place. Its 
configuration of end-missio 
ose is to enable the system to chan 
ERATION and AV-SUBSYS M 
AV-SUBSYS STANDBY and AV-SUBSYS T 
which end-mission applications processing 
reconfiguration; if no 
possibility that the crew or ground control may want to change the end-mission 
applications processing conditions. Thus, for example, reconfiguration training could be 
allowed whereby navigation applications are reconfigured to replace guidance control 
applications loads during an ORBIT-COAST mission mode when no guidance activity was 
needed, although as a training exercise, no actual reconfiguration would take place due to 
the lack of state connectivity. Entry from AV-SUBSYS SAFE/DEGRADED OPERATION 
and AV-SUBSYS MAINTENANCE is inhibited because if there is such a s i w c a n t  
problem with the processing environment that either of these states were entered, then the 
possibility of distorted operating state conditions and data would necessitate either a cold 
restart or significant retesting and then a warm restart. 
In the (REIINITIALIZE sub-state, all subsystems in the affected modules are reset to their 
start up or last acceptable checkpoint condition. Power is not interrupted. Data in the 
affected modules is dumped (or stored for later analysis) and all stacks and other operating 
system references to the affected modules are reset. In the (RE)CONFIGuRE sub-state, some 
or all resources in selected subsystems or modules are being redirected to support other or 
additional tasks, or priority assignments are being changed. All subsystem resources in the 
affected modules are reloaded with new or alternative applications, data for the 
e-directed assignments. 
re-initialized, configured or re-configured 
ible exit from (REHNITIALIZE 
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of applications and data need to and have been loaded for maintenance activity support. 
The other possible exit from (RE)INITIALIZE & (RE)CONFIGURE state is to shut down the 
system if necessary. 
AV-SUBSYS STANDBY is a state in which the avionics subsystem has been initialized, 
processing has been activated and is awaiting commands, sensors and effectors are not 
operating, and in general, no end-mission applications activity is underway. It is a 
relatively temporary condition in which the avionics subsystem has been loaded and 
prepared to carry out its function, but has no direction yet to do anything while waiting for 
mission and vehicle mode sequences to reach a point at which the avionics subsystem must 
provide support. Direction to execute can come from crew commands provided in real- 
time or from pre-assembled timeline sequences. (In the latter case, AV-SUBSYSTEM 
STANDBY might be a very short, transient state.) From AV-SDSYS STANDBY, exits to 
the NORMAL OPERATION (MANUAL or COMPUTER-AIDED OPERATION), AVIONICS 
SAFE-DEGRADED OPERATION, INTERRUPTIVE TEST or AV-SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN is 
possible. 
The NORMAL OPERATION state for generic avionics provides for two substates in space 
vehicles. The first, MANUAL state, is essentially the current state of the art with manual 
setting of switches in a time ordered sequence, either performed by physically flipping 
myriad physical switches as is done on the shuttle for direct control, or by some 
combination of physical and software system-level switches as is done by some of the 
shuttle switches and will be done more extensively on station. . NORMAL OPERATIONS 
activities would include execution of built-in test capabilities that do not interfere with 
normal processing and operation of end-mission applications. For example, performance of 
continuous built-in-test functions would be expected in NORMAL OPERATION. 
NORMAL OPERATIONS would not include operation of maintenance functions by 
maintenance personnel; such activity would be part of the AV-SUBSYS MAINTENANCE 
state as described below. However, some execution of selected maintenance functions could 
be allowed in NORMAL OPERATIONS, depending on crew and ground control rules. 
To cover contingencies requiring a greater degree of autonomous operation, a COMPUTER- 
AIDED OPERATION state has been provided to encompass the commands, controls, events 
and rules for automated (and possibly intelligent) processes which can act without apparent 
immediate direction. For instance, humans could set up a complex expert system to have 
the GN&C subsystem take star readings and the C&T select release of a satellite for 
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communications relay without immediate human intervention - such activities would be 
based on a set of input conditions being detected (such as ent communications loss), 
rules being in place to determine what alternatives might satisfy this c 
being available (such as communications link satellites), non-interfering mission activities 
underway (such as the crew is sleeping), etc. COMPUTER-AIDED OPERATION also 
addresses operation of vehicles such as Voyager or Pioneer which operate for extended 
periods of time without human intervention. 
resources 
While in NORMAL OPERATION, there may be periods or circumstances when crew 
members want to train with specific avionics subsystems, without putting the entire vehicle 
into the VEHICLE TRAINING mode. AV-SUBSYS TRAINING state is provided to address 
those special controls needed to enable crew training on specified subsystems, with interface 
activity carefully controlled to insure training data is isolated from operational subsystems. 
Much of the data used would be simulation data, either running canned to drive the 
training subsystems, or being generated in real time from operating simulations in the 
flight vehicle or on the ground. Such simulation data would be uniquely tagged to clearly 
define it as simulation or training data, not to be confused with real operational data. 
Controls would be established to insure any operational priority issues automatically 
override training activities, with clearly identified "real data" markers for crew and systems 
to preclude any possibility of confusion when training activities are preempted by real 
mission activities. Since this state is based on use of simulations or simulated data, there is 
no entry from MANUAL state, because the training computer aids must first be executed 
(from COMPUTER-AIDED OPERATION) before TRAINING state can be executed. 
An AVIONICS SAFE/DEGRADED OPERATION state is provided for operations under 
several circumstances. First, the VEHICLE SAFE/DEGRADED OPERATION mode may 
have been commanded from NORMAL OPERATION, STORA.GE/STANDBY or VEHICLE 
INITIALIZATION mode (as shown in Figure 2-4), in which case the affected subsystems are 
most likely in AVIONICS SAFE/DEGRADED OPERATION (which may be temporary or 
permanent depending on backup and spares capability). The recognition of the VEHICLE 
SAFE/DEGRADED OPERATION mode is made in the avionics by detection in the 
AV-CTRL of the commands, controls and events generated by vehicle mode controls. A 
second possibility is that some subsystems may have suffered significant failures, during 
which mission operations must continue, but the VEHICLE SAIWDEGRADED 
OPERATION mode has not been commanded. 
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As an avionics level state, AVIONICS SAFE/DEGRADED OPERATION represents a serious 
degradation to a specific avionics subsystem but not to the overall vehicle. The failure effect 
is isolated to a relatively contained area, subsystem or function. Failure response 
alternatives will be tried out, and may remedy the problem enabling a return (after 
INTERRUPTIVE TESTING to verify the reestablished capability) to NORMAL 
OPERATION. While failure alternatives are being detennined and have not yet been 
implemented, the AVIONICS SAFWDEGRADED OPERATION state keeps other 
subsystems aware that there is a problem in progress. An example of this might be if a 
spacecraft command vehicle suffered a disastrous failure of several of its processors, with 
most other subsystems retaining capability and the mission could proceed, then while 
NORMAL OPERATION of the vehicle might be possible, AVIONICS SAFEVDEGRADED 
OPERATIONS might have been necessary for some subsystems until resources could be 
reassigned or other recovery alternatives implemented. 
The INTERRUPTIVE TEST state is available to support more extensive testing than can be 
allowed in NORMAL OPERATIONS. The nominal procedure in built-in testing activity is 
to allow only that continuous built-in testing to proceed during NORMAL OPERATIONS 
which does not interfere with any end-mission or applications processing activities. Failure 
detected through these efforts call for normal or minimal impact recovery procedures as 
part of NORMAL OPERATIONS. If the failures are too extensive to be handled normally, 
then the AVIONICS SAFFdDEGRADED OPERATION state might be required to recover. 
Also, if the vehicle is down for maintenance, then the maintenance activity might call for 
more extensive testing in the INTERRUMWE TEST state also. Of course, crew members 
can command interruptive tests from MANUAL state at any time. When INTERRUPTIVE 
TEST is executing, those specific tests which have been apriori identified as interrupting the 
normal, acceptable flow of processing are selected, scheduled and execution is commanded. 
Unless specifically authorized as part of this state, no interruptive test could be scheduled. 
Thus, this state would have to include functions to verify that it was safe to select 
interruptive tests to perform based on the current mission profile. 
If the avionics are being initialized, and the power-on self-test in the (RE)INITIALIZE & 
(RE)CONFIGURE state detects failures, then two possibilities are allowed. First, if the 
failure is sufficiently mild that NORMAL OPERATION can be entered, then 
INTERRUPTIVE TEST can in turn be entered to perform more extensive checks if the crew 
so desires or testing can be delayed until a later time (as long as the crew recognizes there 
has been a POST failure. The second possibility is that if the failure is too severe to enable 
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the system to achieve NORMAL OPERATION, then it may be necessary to load and 
initialize the AV-SUJ3SYS MAINTENANCE functions, as shown by the arrow from 
(RE)INITIALIZE & (RE)CONFIGURE to support more extensive repair. Entry of 
INTERRUPTIVE TEST from (RE)INITIALIZE & (RE)CONFIGW is not provided because it 
is necessary to set up operating safeguards before INTERRUPTIVE TEST can be entered; 
(RE)INITIALIZE & (RE)CONFIGURE does not offer suffiaent human control to do that 
since that is one purpose of NORMAL OPERATION and AV-SUBSYS MAINTENANCE. 
The detection of NORMAL OPERATION or INITIALIZATION failures that can not be 
isolated, may require the more extensive testing that only INTERRUPTIVE TEST can 
accomplish. This state enables more extensive testing by taking an avionics subsystem off- 
line while more rigorous tests, such as injecting test signal data at the sensors, loading test 
case data for processors, running extensive dedicated tests, etc. are used to identify and 
isolate the fault condition or determine that there is actually no failure. Removal of the 
subsystem or module from the network is needed to insure that no test data or results 
contaminate the network. Exit from this state may take place to the (RE)INITIALIZE & 
(RE)CONFIGURE or the AV-SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN states. If INTERRUPTIVE TEST was 
entered from AV-SUJ3SYS MAINTENANCE, then it can return to AV-SUBSYS 
MAINTENANCE. 
The AV-SUBSYS MAINTENANCE state is provided for the use of specialized 
maintenance analysis programs, operation of a maintenance version of an avionics 
subsystem program with special breakpoints and hooks for pulling off maintenance data, 
use of specialized maintenance data sets, etc. It can be only be entered if the (REINITIALIZE 
& (RE)CONFIGURE state has loaded this special set of applications first. After it has started, 
it may call on INTERRUPTrVE TEST to check various issues, and then continue 
maintenance checking and debugging. Exit from this state is by way of an avionics shut 
down of affected subsystems to insure any loaded code, data or operating conditions which 
are not ordinarily in use can be thoroughly purged from the system. 
The transition to AV-SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN occurs when a VEHICLE SHUT-DOWN 
mode or the AV-SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN state is commanded. Such a command can be 
issued by SOCS, or by other authorized elements (such as special maintenance applications). 
AV-SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN may also be entered when an avionics subsystem fails to 
successfully (re)initialize or (re)configure upon command, is commanded off while in the 
AV-SUBSYS STANDBY state, is manually switched off, is directed by an automated process 
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to cycle power, has power cycled from a test routine in INTERRUPTIVE TEST or 
AV-SUBSYS MAINTENANCE, or is shutdown due to failures from the AVIONICS 
SAFE/DEGRADED OPERATION state. AV-SUBSYS SHUT-DOWN involves either cycling 
the power to force a cold boot restart, or to simply turn-off a specific avionics subsystem. 
Especially under failure conditions, there may be a need to physically shut down failed 
systems (or systems with failed components) to force them to stop erroneous processing and 
false data generation. (After they have been shut down, then additional maintenance or 
reconfiguration activities can take place to try and restore proper functional operation.) 
24-11 
2.5 FUNCTION STATES 
Function states describe the control of the major functional entities within an avionics 
subsystem. In this document, we are only addressing the SDSS functional entities shown in 
Figure 2-10. The services such as standard data services, data ba nagement, network 
services, and data system services are controlled by the operating system, shown in light 
grey shading. The operating system is also controlled as noted above because it is one 
component of the AV-CTRL entity. The operating system is defined to be the SDSS-CTRL 
entity or function. It controls its sibling SDSS functions. The analysis could be similarly 
performed for the functions in other avionics subsystems such as GN&C or C&T. 
Figure 2-10. SDSS Functional Activities That Must Be Controlled 
The function states describe the control of the functional entities in the SDSS. Regardless of 
the mission mode, vehicle mode, or avionics state, any interaction within the system in 
other than OW modes or states will require some support from SDSS service functions. 
Figure 2-11 describes the relationships of the SDSS functional entities and the SDSS 
function state transitions. In the Space Station Freedom program, SDSS is performed by the 
Data Management System DMS) and the SDSS-CTRL is performed by the Lynx-OS. 
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For each avionics state change, there may be several intervening operating system and data 
system service calls until the final avionics state change is achieved. The SDSS function 
states and state transitions define the allowable functional behavior which the operating 
system can effect. Each state encompasses the set of commands, controls, events, conditions 
and procedures needed to safely operate the data system services in a stable manner. The 
transitions from one state to another establish how the SDSS functional entities transition 
from one stable set of processes and condition look-up tables to another. For instance, 
SERVICE OPERATION establishes the allowable conditions for normal calls to services 
such as RODB Write, while SCHEDULED TESTING calls up the controls needed for specific 
built-in tests such as memory self-test to be run. 
Since the operating system controls all interaction within data system services, it is the 
entity which determines what commands, controls, and events the data system will 
recognize and respond to, under what conditions, at what times, and in what sequences. 
This behavior control is based on the basic rules and procedures encoded in the operating 
system design. These are states because they are selected by the operating system controller 
based on the encoded responses allowed it for each input command, control or event and 
the conditions it satisfies. As experience with International Business Machines (IBM) 
compatible Personal Computers 8Cs) and MacIntosh computers has shown, the command 
given by the human at the keyboard or mouse does not always translate into the system 
control activity anticipated by the human. 
Although each state is mutually exclusive, whether or not this could be accomplished on a 
multi-tasking or thread basis would have to be determined case by case for each 
implementation. For example, using the last set of examples, one thread could be 
performing a RODB Write while another is performing a memory self-test. For the generic 
data system architecture, Figure 2-12 shows the SDSS states and allowable state transition 
paths. 
The default entry for normal data system operation is into the SDSS-OFF state, since an 
external (to the SDSS) power source i s  needed to start or boot the system. The focus here is 
on taking a single processor from a "cold condition with no power to a "warm" condition 
with power available. In a multiprocessor based system, this state would still be needed for 
each processor. As previously noted, power would be applied in the VEHICLE OFF mode 
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Figure 2-12. Function State Transitions Must be Constrained 
and the SDSS Avionics Subsystem AVIONICS OFF state. As can be seen by this figure, the 
entire data system must be.powered up as one entity. Once power is applied, the data 
system must initialize and configure all its elements. 
Initialization and configuration of the data system is accomplished by entering the 
(RE)INITIALIZE & (RE)CONFIGURE state. When the data system is in the SDSS-OFF state, 
the entire avionics can not operate, and is essentially just "cold iron". Onl 
subsystem, or any battery-backed specialized subs 
operate at a minimal level of built-in capability, such 
up read only memory device to kick start the app 
routines. 
When power is applied to the data system for the 
(RE)INITIALIZE & (RE)CONFIGURE state by starting 
routines. This includes power-on self test, resource a 
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initiation of designated applications, allocation of resources to applications, etc. Re-entry 
into this state later causes either a warm or cold restart, or a reconfiguration, depending on 
the condition in effect at that time. The normal exit from this state is to enter standby. An 
alternative exit is in support of maintenance activities. Otherwise, it can only transition to 
the SDSS SHUT-DOWN state if it is unable to successfully startup and configure. 
After the data system has stabilized in an initialized, configured condition, it enters the 
standby state where it awaits an external command to start servicing activities, i.e., it is 
"warm", checked out, and ready to perform its function.. Upon direction, the data system 
enters the FULL SERVICE OPERATION state. Such direction may be explicit by crew, by 
timelines, or by special startup configuration controls. In the FULL SERVICE OPERATION 
state, the data system responds to service requests to support external applications (such as 
GN&C requesting a RODB Write). A service request to perform a data system test service 
(such as a SOCS call for or timer initiated performance of built-in testing) causes a transition 
into the SCHEDULED TESTING state. The only other possible transitions from SDSS 
STANDBY are to SDSS SAFE/DEGRADED OPERATION or to SDSS SHUT-DOWN. A 
transition from SDSS STANDBY into SAFE/DEGRADED OPERATION would occur when 
the system has successfully initialized with configurations such as use of partially-failed 
components, insufficient resources, or missing applications or modules. A transition to 
SDSS SHUT-DOWN could be commanded by the crew or SOCS while SDSS is in standby. 
The FULL SERVICE OPERATION is the normal state of service for external applications, 
and integrates the behavior of the SDSS functions for standard services, data services, 
network services and data system services. It establishes the calls to the operating system to 
initiate these services, how they are handled, under what conditions they are accepted or 
rejected, what happens to call errors, etc. Direction can also be handled to return to the 
STANDBY state. This state also includes the support SDSS might have to provide to enable 
end-mission applications software to load and initialize. If commanded, this state can 
transition back to (RE)INITIALIZE & (RE)CONFIGURE for configuration changes or reboots, 
can change to the SCHEDULED TESTING state to run specific built-in test diagnostics, or can 
transition to the SDSS SAFE/DEGRADED OPERATION state if  failures preclude normal 
operation. 
The SCHEDULED TESTING state supports any directed test, whether it is off-line, on-line 
but not interfering, or disruptive of end-mission applications or other activities. This is a 
relatively "dumb" state which simply knows what all possible tests are, how to add more 
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tests if directed and how to insure the tests are safely executed. It does not know how to 
determine if a test is appropriate to the current operational modes or crew activities; such a 
determination would be made by as part of a higher level mode (such as 
OPERATIONS) or state (INTERRUPTIVE TEST) functional check. This state includes 
special functional control checks required to insure this state is properly called and 
authorized; that is why a separate state is used. Another reason for providing this state is to 
facilitate manual control over testing and manual override over system initiated tests. 
Such manual or override control could more easily bypass any built-in restrictions and 
conditions tests included as part of higher level mode or state condition checking. 
The SCHEDULED TESTING state may be entered from any power-up state in the SDSS 
Function State diagram. Entry from (RE)INITIALIZE & (RE)CONFIGURE is provided to 
support initialization power-on self testing. Entry from SDSS STANDBY is provided to 
enable system checks to continue while in a standby condition to insure the system will 
continue to operate when called upon. Entry from SDSS SAFE/DEGRADED OPERATION 
is provided to enable testing and retesting of failed or partially failed elements in SDSS. 
Normal exit from SCHEDULED TESTING is either to power down and re-boot, or to 
reinitialize to insure no test data and results contaminate normal operational service. 
While maintenance activities are in process, exit to the SDSS MAINTENANCE state is 
acceptable also. 
In the event failures force a transition into the SDSS SAFE/DEGRADED OPERATION state, 
special routines and priorities appropriate to the conditions of the failure, and authorized by 
the crew, would be instituted to enable crew survival, mission survival, and/or safety of 
systems. In the event an emergency is declared by the crew, then SAFE substate conditions 
would apply selected elements of the special emergency priorities and routings that are 
allowed only in emergencies. 
If maintenance personnel are loading special versions of the operating system with 
maintenance diagnostics added, with extended built-in testing, or with debugging hooks 
enabled, then a direct transition from @%)INITIALIZE & (RE)CONFIGURE to the SDSS 
MAINTENANCE state may be performed. From the SDSS MANITNANCE state, more 
direct maintenance control over the system is possible, using specialized maintenance 
versions of the operating system and data tables as needed. Special calls to the SCHEDULED 
be effected, or a shutdown and restart can be done. 
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3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
3.1 CONCLUSIONS 
There are four levels of modes and states possible in a system as summarized by Figure 3-1. 
The Mission Mode level governs the interactions of mission entities (e.g., 
vehicles, ground control, TDRSS, and astronauts) in the external environment 
with a flight vehicle that have a direct affect on the mission success. 
* The Vehicle Mode level governs the interactions of subsystem entities (e.g., 
power, propulsion, avionics, and crew) within the vehicle which are directly 
responsible for accomplishing the mission of the vehicle. There is a separate 
Vehicle Mode diagram for each mission entity. 
The Subsystem State level identifies all the interactions of functions or 
functional entities within a vehicle subsystem which must interoperate to 
support the mode decisions of the crew and ground control. There is a separate 
Subsystem State diagram for each vehicle subsystem entity. In this document, 
the avionics subsystem functions (e.g., GN&C, C&T, SOCS and SDSS) are used to 
show the Avionics Subsystem State interactions. 
0 The Function State level identifies all the interactions of the processes within an 
vehicle subsystem's function which must interoperate to perform the function's 
defined purpose or to service requests for support from any other function. 
There is a separate Functions State diagram for each subsystem's functional 
entity. In this document, the Space Data System Services function state 
interactions for its processes; e.g., standard services, data base management, data 
system management, and network services; are shown and used as an example. 
Each of the modes and states in such a hierarchy (as shown in Figure 3-1) behaves 
differently in supporting an actual mission scenario with its attendant mode and state 
changes. As shown in the figure, a mission mode change from COAST to BOOST, at the 
Mission Mode level causes operational activities to take place for all mission elements to 
insure they are functioning in a cooperative manner, and that multi-vehicle/center 
mission activities are properly sequenced. 
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Within a vehicle, the Vehicle Mode level then insures proper sequencing of safe vehicle 
activities, such as verifying and authenticating the mode change command, determining 
the BOOST mode requirements for the flight vehicle, setting up the transition, issuing the 
vehicle commands and controls which cause the Vehicle Mode level subsystems to behave 
properly, then activating the BOOST mode subsystem activities. 
There is a Subsystem State transition diagram for each of the Vehicle Mode subsystems. For 
this example, only the Avionics Subsystem State transitions are addressed. In this Avionics 
Subsystem State level, SOCS is the overall operational controller working through the 
AV-CTRL controller, with responsibility for checking all operating conditions, vehicle 
subsystem status, and directing SDSS to distribute commands and controls to the 
appropriate avionics subsystems. SOCS directs C&T to distribute telemetry and ground 
control command acknowledgments back to the ground, directs GNC to follow the 
provided sequence of thruster firings, etc. 
For each Avionics Subsystem State, there is a Function State transition diagram. For this 
example, only the Space Data System Services Function State transitions are addressed. At 
the SDSS Function State level, the operating system (SDSS-CTRL) is the overall controller, 
with responsibility for controlling the interaction of all S D S  services. 
Some of the ramifications of this modes and states structure are described below. 
The Mission and Vehicle Modes chosen by crew or ground control, and the Avionics 
Subsystem States subsequently selected, make no apparent difference on the definition of 
process states and their transition structure, as shown at the Function State transition level. 
Thus, whether the system is in the MANUAL Avionics Subsystem State or in the 
TRAINING Vehicle Mode has no apparent affect on the structure of the avionics functional 
processes - i.e., the same guidance or operating system functions are needed in both cases. 
What is affected is the capability of these functional processes to operate, which depends on 
what conditions and controls are true/false (not their transition structure). The differences 
between the MANUAL state and TRAINING mode are not visible below the avionics 
subsystem level - again, low level processes are required in any case. Mode changes can 
cause a switch from one state model to another, or from one set of allowable behaviors in a 
model to another set of allowable behaviors. Since it is the avionics functional processes 
and their state transitions which are actually implemented in hardware and software, this 
means their design is relatively insensitive to changes in desired use of modes and avionics 
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subsystem states, which can thus be definitized later without drastic cost impact (as long as 
their scope is consistent). 
services offered by SDSS are available for any subsystem or function to call upon regardless 
of the modes of the system. However, some modes will not permit some operations to take 
place. The implementation of activities at any level may create events or cause conditions 
to become true/false; which in turn can be detected at other levels to cause further activities 
to take place at other levels. 
At higher levels of states and modes, the effects of crew or ground control desires become 
more pronounced. Specific crew or ground control desired actions can be broken into their 
component parts using this model of system behavior in order to determine if the system 
will respond the way the developers intended, and whether that response is desired by the 
human users. 
This analysis identified the boundary conditions applicable to a simulation of the SDSS 
function state. Development of such a simulation is underway to define the behavioral 
responses of the SDSS to possible activities generated in the other modes and states of an 
advanced generic avionics system. 
3.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The key question which needs to be understood in developing an advanced avionics system 
is: 
How will the system behave? 
s and outputs of the system; it is 
e that is intimately involved in 
choose to follow, and in the responses they might choose to 
behavior it is impossible to insure that the 
hus, this analysis defines a paradigm 
developing an adva 
system. 
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A key follow-on that needs to be accomplished is development of simulations for this 
behavioral model. A missi 
mission behaviors in a documented manner that could be captured by developers. A 
vehicle mode simulation could enable the potential interactions of the crew and subsystems 
to be investigated in a rigorous manner. An avionics subsystem state simulation could 
investigate the behavior of the system in different situations. A function state simulation 
for each of the avionics functions could establish the boundaries of acceptable behavior, and 
identify unacceptable system/subsystem responses. Definition of such behavioral patterns 
prior to system design or construction would reduce the costs of redesigning or rebuilding 
the systems or subsystems to meet unexpected and unacceptable behaviors discovered in 
development or flight testing. 
mode simulation could enable the crew to investigate 
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